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nixpkgs/nixos/modules/system/boot/luksroot.nix

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{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
with lib;
let
luks = config.boot.initrd.luks;
kernelPackages = config.boot.kernelPackages;
commonFunctions = ''
die() {
echo "$@" >&2
exit 1
}
dev_exist() {
local target="$1"
if [ -e $target ]; then
return 0
else
local uuid=$(echo -n $target | sed -e 's,UUID=\(.*\),\1,g')
blkid --uuid $uuid >/dev/null
return $?
fi
}
wait_target() {
local name="$1"
local target="$2"
local secs="''${3:-10}"
local desc="''${4:-$name $target to appear}"
if ! dev_exist $target; then
echo -n "Waiting $secs seconds for $desc..."
local success=false;
for try in $(seq $secs); do
echo -n "."
sleep 1
if dev_exist $target; then
success=true
break
fi
done
if [ $success == true ]; then
echo " - success";
return 0
else
echo " - failure";
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}
wait_yubikey() {
local secs="''${1:-10}"
ykinfo -v 1>/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo -n "Waiting $secs seconds for Yubikey to appear..."
local success=false
for try in $(seq $secs); do
echo -n .
sleep 1
ykinfo -v 1>/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? == 0 ]; then
success=true
break
fi
done
if [ $success == true ]; then
echo " - success";
return 0
else
echo " - failure";
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}
wait_gpgcard() {
local secs="''${1:-10}"
gpg --card-status > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo -n "Waiting $secs seconds for GPG Card to appear"
local success=false
for try in $(seq $secs); do
echo -n .
sleep 1
gpg --card-status > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
if [ $? == 0 ]; then
success=true
break
fi
done
if [ $success == true ]; then
echo " - success";
return 0
else
echo " - failure";
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}
'';
preCommands = ''
# A place to store crypto things
# A ramfs is used here to ensure that the file used to update
# the key slot with cryptsetup will never get swapped out.
# Warning: Do NOT replace with tmpfs!
mkdir -p /crypt-ramfs
mount -t ramfs none /crypt-ramfs
# Cryptsetup locking directory
mkdir -p /run/cryptsetup
# For Yubikey salt storage
mkdir -p /crypt-storage
${optionalString luks.gpgSupport ''
export GPG_TTY=$(tty)
export GNUPGHOME=/crypt-ramfs/.gnupg
gpg-agent --daemon --scdaemon-program $out/bin/scdaemon > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
''}
# Disable all input echo for the whole stage. We could use read -s
# instead but that would ocasionally leak characters between read
# invocations.
stty -echo
'';
postCommands = ''
stty echo
umount /crypt-storage 2>/dev/null
umount /crypt-ramfs 2>/dev/null
'';
2020-01-13 11:07:48 +00:00
openCommand = name': { name, device, header, keyFile, keyFileSize, keyFileOffset, allowDiscards, yubikey, gpgCard, fido2, fallbackToPassword, ... }: assert name' == name;
let
csopen = "cryptsetup luksOpen ${device} ${name} ${optionalString allowDiscards "--allow-discards"} ${optionalString (header != null) "--header=${header}"}";
cschange = "cryptsetup luksChangeKey ${device} ${optionalString (header != null) "--header=${header}"}";
in ''
# Wait for luksRoot (and optionally keyFile and/or header) to appear, e.g.
# if on a USB drive.
wait_target "device" ${device} || die "${device} is unavailable"
${optionalString (header != null) ''
wait_target "header" ${header} || die "${header} is unavailable"
''}
do_open_passphrase() {
local passphrase
while true; do
echo -n "Passphrase for ${device}: "
passphrase=
while true; do
if [ -e /crypt-ramfs/passphrase ]; then
echo "reused"
passphrase=$(cat /crypt-ramfs/passphrase)
break
else
# ask cryptsetup-askpass
echo -n "${device}" > /crypt-ramfs/device
# and try reading it from /dev/console with a timeout
IFS= read -t 1 -r passphrase
if [ -n "$passphrase" ]; then
${if luks.reusePassphrases then ''
# remember it for the next device
echo -n "$passphrase" > /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
'' else ''
# Don't save it to ramfs. We are very paranoid
''}
echo
break
fi
fi
done
echo -n "Verifying passphrase for ${device}..."
echo -n "$passphrase" | ${csopen} --key-file=-
if [ $? == 0 ]; then
echo " - success"
${if luks.reusePassphrases then ''
# we don't rm here because we might reuse it for the next device
'' else ''
rm -f /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
''}
break
else
echo " - failure"
# ask for a different one
rm -f /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
fi
done
}
# LUKS
open_normally() {
${if (keyFile != null) then ''
if wait_target "key file" ${keyFile}; then
${csopen} --key-file=${keyFile} \
${optionalString (keyFileSize != null) "--keyfile-size=${toString keyFileSize}"} \
${optionalString (keyFileOffset != null) "--keyfile-offset=${toString keyFileOffset}"}
else
${if fallbackToPassword then "echo" else "die"} "${keyFile} is unavailable"
echo " - failing back to interactive password prompt"
do_open_passphrase
fi
'' else ''
do_open_passphrase
''}
}
${optionalString (luks.yubikeySupport && (yubikey != null)) ''
# Yubikey
rbtohex() {
Replace the current Yubikey PBA implementation with the previous one. Rationale: * The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack successfully recovering the new LUKS key. * However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key. * Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret has also been recovered by the attacker. * Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful. * Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot, so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself). Summary: The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to the Yubikey itself.
2014-02-03 21:50:17 +00:00
( od -An -vtx1 | tr -d ' \n' )
}
hextorb() {
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
( tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]' | sed -e 's/\([0-9A-F]\{2\}\)/\\\\\\x\1/gI' | xargs printf )
}
do_open_yubikey() {
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
# Make all of these local to this function
# to prevent their values being leaked
local salt
local iterations
local k_user
local challenge
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
local response
local k_luks
Replace the current Yubikey PBA implementation with the previous one. Rationale: * The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack successfully recovering the new LUKS key. * However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key. * Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret has also been recovered by the attacker. * Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful. * Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot, so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself). Summary: The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to the Yubikey itself.
2014-02-03 21:50:17 +00:00
local opened
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
local new_salt
local new_iterations
local new_challenge
local new_response
local new_k_luks
mount -t ${yubikey.storage.fsType} ${yubikey.storage.device} /crypt-storage || \
die "Failed to mount Yubikey salt storage device"
salt="$(cat /crypt-storage${yubikey.storage.path} | sed -n 1p | tr -d '\n')"
iterations="$(cat /crypt-storage${yubikey.storage.path} | sed -n 2p | tr -d '\n')"
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
challenge="$(echo -n $salt | openssl-wrap dgst -binary -sha512 | rbtohex)"
response="$(ykchalresp -${toString yubikey.slot} -x $challenge 2>/dev/null)"
for try in $(seq 3); do
${optionalString yubikey.twoFactor ''
echo -n "Enter two-factor passphrase: "
read -r k_user
echo
''}
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
if [ ! -z "$k_user" ]; then
k_luks="$(echo -n $k_user | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $iterations $response | rbtohex)"
else
k_luks="$(echo | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $iterations $response | rbtohex)"
fi
echo -n "$k_luks" | hextorb | ${csopen} --key-file=-
if [ $? == 0 ]; then
Replace the current Yubikey PBA implementation with the previous one. Rationale: * The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack successfully recovering the new LUKS key. * However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key. * Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret has also been recovered by the attacker. * Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful. * Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot, so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself). Summary: The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to the Yubikey itself.
2014-02-03 21:50:17 +00:00
opened=true
break
else
Replace the current Yubikey PBA implementation with the previous one. Rationale: * The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack successfully recovering the new LUKS key. * However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key. * Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret has also been recovered by the attacker. * Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful. * Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot, so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself). Summary: The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to the Yubikey itself.
2014-02-03 21:50:17 +00:00
opened=false
echo "Authentication failed!"
fi
done
[ "$opened" == false ] && die "Maximum authentication errors reached"
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
echo -n "Gathering entropy for new salt (please enter random keys to generate entropy if this blocks for long)..."
for i in $(seq ${toString yubikey.saltLength}); do
byte="$(dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=1 2>/dev/null | rbtohex)";
new_salt="$new_salt$byte";
echo -n .
done;
echo "ok"
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
new_iterations="$iterations"
${optionalString (yubikey.iterationStep > 0) ''
new_iterations="$(($new_iterations + ${toString yubikey.iterationStep}))"
''}
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
new_challenge="$(echo -n $new_salt | openssl-wrap dgst -binary -sha512 | rbtohex)"
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
new_response="$(ykchalresp -${toString yubikey.slot} -x $new_challenge 2>/dev/null)"
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
if [ ! -z "$k_user" ]; then
new_k_luks="$(echo -n $k_user | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $new_iterations $new_response | rbtohex)"
else
new_k_luks="$(echo | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $new_iterations $new_response | rbtohex)"
fi
echo -n "$new_k_luks" | hextorb > /crypt-ramfs/new_key
echo -n "$k_luks" | hextorb | ${cschange} --key-file=- /crypt-ramfs/new_key
Replace the current Yubikey PBA implementation with the previous one. Rationale: * The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack successfully recovering the new LUKS key. * However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key. * Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret has also been recovered by the attacker. * Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful. * Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot, so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself). Summary: The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to the Yubikey itself.
2014-02-03 21:50:17 +00:00
if [ $? == 0 ]; then
echo -ne "$new_salt\n$new_iterations" > /crypt-storage${yubikey.storage.path}
else
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-05 16:10:59 +00:00
echo "Warning: Could not update LUKS key, current challenge persists!"
fi
rm -f /crypt-ramfs/new_key
umount /crypt-storage
}
open_with_hardware() {
if wait_yubikey ${toString yubikey.gracePeriod}; then
do_open_yubikey
else
echo "No yubikey found, falling back to non-yubikey open procedure"
open_normally
fi
}
''}
${optionalString (luks.gpgSupport && (gpgCard != null)) ''
do_open_gpg_card() {
# Make all of these local to this function
# to prevent their values being leaked
local pin
local opened
gpg --import /gpg-keys/${device}/pubkey.asc > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
gpg --card-status > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
for try in $(seq 3); do
echo -n "PIN for GPG Card associated with device ${device}: "
pin=
while true; do
if [ -e /crypt-ramfs/passphrase ]; then
echo "reused"
pin=$(cat /crypt-ramfs/passphrase)
break
else
# and try reading it from /dev/console with a timeout
IFS= read -t 1 -r pin
if [ -n "$pin" ]; then
${if luks.reusePassphrases then ''
# remember it for the next device
echo -n "$pin" > /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
'' else ''
# Don't save it to ramfs. We are very paranoid
''}
echo
break
fi
fi
done
echo -n "Verifying passphrase for ${device}..."
echo -n "$pin" | gpg -q --batch --passphrase-fd 0 --pinentry-mode loopback -d /gpg-keys/${device}/cryptkey.gpg 2> /dev/null | ${csopen} --key-file=- > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
if [ $? == 0 ]; then
echo " - success"
${if luks.reusePassphrases then ''
# we don't rm here because we might reuse it for the next device
'' else ''
rm -f /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
''}
break
else
echo " - failure"
# ask for a different one
rm -f /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
fi
done
[ "$opened" == false ] && die "Maximum authentication errors reached"
}
open_with_hardware() {
if wait_gpgcard ${toString gpgCard.gracePeriod}; then
do_open_gpg_card
else
echo "No GPG Card found, falling back to normal open procedure"
open_normally
fi
}
''}
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${optionalString (luks.fido2Support && (fido2.credential != null)) ''
open_with_hardware() {
local passsphrase
${if fido2.passwordLess then ''
export passphrase=""
'' else ''
read -rsp "FIDO2 salt for ${device}: " passphrase
echo
''}
${optionalString (lib.versionOlder kernelPackages.kernel.version "5.4") ''
echo "On systems with Linux Kernel < 5.4, it might take a while to initialize the CRNG, you might want to use linuxPackages_latest."
echo "Please move your mouse to create needed randomness."
''}
echo "Waiting for your FIDO2 device..."
fido2luks -i open ${device} ${name} ${fido2.credential} --await-dev ${toString fido2.gracePeriod} --salt string:$passphrase
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "No FIDO2 key found, falling back to normal open procedure"
open_normally
2020-01-13 11:07:48 +00:00
fi
}
''}
${if (luks.yubikeySupport && (yubikey != null)) || (luks.gpgSupport && (gpgCard != null)) || (luks.fido2Support && (fido2.credential != null)) then ''
open_with_hardware
'' else ''
open_normally
''}
'';
askPass = pkgs.writeScriptBin "cryptsetup-askpass" ''
#!/bin/sh
${commonFunctions}
while true; do
wait_target "luks" /crypt-ramfs/device 10 "LUKS to request a passphrase" || die "Passphrase is not requested now"
device=$(cat /crypt-ramfs/device)
echo -n "Passphrase for $device: "
IFS= read -rs passphrase
echo
rm /crypt-ramfs/device
echo -n "$passphrase" > /crypt-ramfs/passphrase
done
'';
preLVM = filterAttrs (n: v: v.preLVM) luks.devices;
postLVM = filterAttrs (n: v: !v.preLVM) luks.devices;
in
{
imports = [
(mkRemovedOptionModule [ "boot" "initrd" "luks" "enable" ] "")
];
options = {
boot.initrd.luks.mitigateDMAAttacks = mkOption {
type = types.bool;
default = true;
description = ''
2013-07-23 17:56:12 +01:00
Unless enabled, encryption keys can be easily recovered by an attacker with physical
access to any machine with PCMCIA, ExpressCard, ThunderBolt or FireWire port.
More information is available at <link xlink:href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMA_attack"/>.
2013-07-23 17:56:12 +01:00
This option blacklists FireWire drivers, but doesn't remove them. You can manually
load the drivers if you need to use a FireWire device, but don't forget to unload them!
'';
};
boot.initrd.luks.cryptoModules = mkOption {
2015-06-15 17:18:46 +01:00
type = types.listOf types.str;
2013-07-23 17:56:12 +01:00
default =
[ "aes" "aes_generic" "blowfish" "twofish"
"serpent" "cbc" "xts" "lrw" "sha1" "sha256" "sha512"
"af_alg" "algif_skcipher"
(if pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system == "x86_64-linux" then "aes_x86_64" else "aes_i586")
2013-07-23 17:56:12 +01:00
];
description = ''
2013-07-23 17:56:12 +01:00
A list of cryptographic kernel modules needed to decrypt the root device(s).
The default includes all common modules.
'';
};
boot.initrd.luks.forceLuksSupportInInitrd = mkOption {
type = types.bool;
default = false;
internal = true;
description = ''
Whether to configure luks support in the initrd, when no luks
devices are configured.
'';
};
boot.initrd.luks.reusePassphrases = mkOption {
type = types.bool;
default = true;
description = ''
When opening a new LUKS device try reusing last successful
passphrase.
Useful for mounting a number of devices that use the same
passphrase without retyping it several times.
Such setup can be useful if you use <command>cryptsetup
luksSuspend</command>. Different LUKS devices will still have
different master keys even when using the same passphrase.
'';
};
boot.initrd.luks.devices = mkOption {
default = { };
2019-08-13 22:52:01 +01:00
example = { luksroot.device = "/dev/disk/by-uuid/430e9eff-d852-4f68-aa3b-2fa3599ebe08"; };
description = ''
The encrypted disk that should be opened before the root
filesystem is mounted. Both LVM-over-LUKS and LUKS-over-LVM
2017-07-02 03:37:51 +01:00
setups are supported. The unencrypted devices can be accessed as
<filename>/dev/mapper/<replaceable>name</replaceable></filename>.
'';
type = with types; loaOf (submodule (
{ name, ... }: { options = {
name = mkOption {
visible = false;
default = name;
example = "luksroot";
type = types.str;
description = "Name of the unencrypted device in <filename>/dev/mapper</filename>.";
};
device = mkOption {
example = "/dev/disk/by-uuid/430e9eff-d852-4f68-aa3b-2fa3599ebe08";
type = types.str;
description = "Path of the underlying encrypted block device.";
};
2014-08-29 17:43:03 +01:00
header = mkOption {
default = null;
example = "/root/header.img";
type = types.nullOr types.str;
description = ''
The name of the file or block device that
should be used as header for the encrypted device.
'';
};
2014-08-29 17:43:03 +01:00
keyFile = mkOption {
default = null;
example = "/dev/sdb1";
type = types.nullOr types.str;
description = ''
The name of the file (can be a raw device or a partition) that
should be used as the decryption key for the encrypted device. If
not specified, you will be prompted for a passphrase instead.
'';
};
keyFileSize = mkOption {
default = null;
example = 4096;
type = types.nullOr types.int;
description = ''
The size of the key file. Use this if only the beginning of the
key file should be used as a key (often the case if a raw device
or partition is used as key file). If not specified, the whole
<literal>keyFile</literal> will be used decryption, instead of just
the first <literal>keyFileSize</literal> bytes.
'';
};
keyFileOffset = mkOption {
default = null;
example = 4096;
type = types.nullOr types.int;
description = ''
The offset of the key file. Use this in combination with
<literal>keyFileSize</literal> to use part of a file as key file
(often the case if a raw device or partition is used as a key file).
If not specified, the key begins at the first byte of
<literal>keyFile</literal>.
'';
};
# FIXME: get rid of this option.
preLVM = mkOption {
default = true;
type = types.bool;
description = "Whether the luksOpen will be attempted before LVM scan or after it.";
};
allowDiscards = mkOption {
default = false;
type = types.bool;
description = ''
Whether to allow TRIM requests to the underlying device. This option
has security implications; please read the LUKS documentation before
activating it.
'';
};
2014-08-29 17:43:03 +01:00
fallbackToPassword = mkOption {
default = false;
type = types.bool;
description = ''
Whether to fallback to interactive passphrase prompt if the keyfile
cannot be found. This will prevent unattended boot should the keyfile
go missing.
'';
};
gpgCard = mkOption {
default = null;
description = ''
The option to use this LUKS device with a GPG encrypted luks password by the GPG Smartcard.
If null (the default), GPG-Smartcard will be disabled for this device.
'';
type = with types; nullOr (submodule {
options = {
gracePeriod = mkOption {
default = 10;
type = types.int;
description = "Time in seconds to wait for the GPG Smartcard.";
};
encryptedPass = mkOption {
default = "";
type = types.path;
description = "Path to the GPG encrypted passphrase.";
};
publicKey = mkOption {
default = "";
type = types.path;
description = "Path to the Public Key.";
};
};
});
};
2020-01-13 11:07:48 +00:00
fido2 = {
credential = mkOption {
default = null;
example = "f1d00200d8dc783f7fb1e10ace8da27f8312d72692abfca2f7e4960a73f48e82e1f7571f6ebfcee9fb434f9886ccc8fcc52a6614d8d2";
type = types.str;
description = "The FIDO2 credential ID.";
};
gracePeriod = mkOption {
default = 10;
type = types.int;
description = "Time in seconds to wait for the FIDO2 key.";
};
passwordLess = mkOption {
default = false;
type = types.bool;
description = ''
Defines whatever to use an empty string as a default salt.
Enable only when your device is PIN protected, such as <link xlink:href="https://trezor.io/">Trezor</link>.
'';
};
};
yubikey = mkOption {
default = null;
description = ''
The options to use for this LUKS device in Yubikey-PBA.
If null (the default), Yubikey-PBA will be disabled for this device.
'';
type = with types; nullOr (submodule {
options = {
twoFactor = mkOption {
default = true;
type = types.bool;
description = "Whether to use a passphrase and a Yubikey (true), or only a Yubikey (false).";
};
slot = mkOption {
default = 2;
type = types.int;
description = "Which slot on the Yubikey to challenge.";
};
saltLength = mkOption {
default = 16;
type = types.int;
description = "Length of the new salt in byte (64 is the effective maximum).";
};
keyLength = mkOption {
default = 64;
type = types.int;
description = "Length of the LUKS slot key derived with PBKDF2 in byte.";
};
iterationStep = mkOption {
default = 0;
type = types.int;
description = "How much the iteration count for PBKDF2 is increased at each successful authentication.";
};
gracePeriod = mkOption {
default = 10;
type = types.int;
description = "Time in seconds to wait for the Yubikey.";
};
/* TODO: Add to the documentation of the current module:
Options related to the storing the salt.
*/
storage = {
device = mkOption {
default = "/dev/sda1";
type = types.path;
description = ''
An unencrypted device that will temporarily be mounted in stage-1.
Must contain the current salt to create the challenge for this LUKS device.
'';
};
fsType = mkOption {
default = "vfat";
type = types.str;
description = "The filesystem of the unencrypted device.";
};
path = mkOption {
default = "/crypt-storage/default";
type = types.str;
description = ''
Absolute path of the salt on the unencrypted device with
that device's root directory as "/".
'';
};
};
};
});
};
};
}));
};
boot.initrd.luks.gpgSupport = mkOption {
default = false;
type = types.bool;
description = ''
Enables support for authenticating with a GPG encrypted password.
'';
};
boot.initrd.luks.yubikeySupport = mkOption {
default = false;
type = types.bool;
description = ''
Enables support for authenticating with a Yubikey on LUKS devices.
See the NixOS wiki for information on how to properly setup a LUKS device
and a Yubikey to work with this feature.
'';
};
2020-01-13 11:07:48 +00:00
boot.initrd.luks.fido2Support = mkOption {
default = false;
type = types.bool;
description = ''
Enables support for authenticating with FIDO2 devices.
'';
};
};
config = mkIf (luks.devices != {} || luks.forceLuksSupportInInitrd) {
assertions =
[ { assertion = !(luks.gpgSupport && luks.yubikeySupport);
message = "Yubikey and GPG Card may not be used at the same time.";
}
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{ assertion = !(luks.gpgSupport && luks.fido2Support);
message = "FIDO2 and GPG Card may not be used at the same time.";
}
{ assertion = !(luks.fido2Support && luks.yubikeySupport);
message = "FIDO2 and Yubikey may not be used at the same time.";
}
];
# actually, sbp2 driver is the one enabling the DMA attack, but this needs to be tested
boot.blacklistedKernelModules = optionals luks.mitigateDMAAttacks
["firewire_ohci" "firewire_core" "firewire_sbp2"];
# Some modules that may be needed for mounting anything ciphered
boot.initrd.availableKernelModules = [ "dm_mod" "dm_crypt" "cryptd" "input_leds" ]
2018-02-25 20:36:19 +00:00
++ luks.cryptoModules
# workaround until https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148783562211457&w=4 is merged
# remove once 'modprobe --show-depends xts' shows ecb as a dependency
++ (if builtins.elem "xts" luks.cryptoModules then ["ecb"] else []);
# copy the cryptsetup binary and it's dependencies
boot.initrd.extraUtilsCommands = ''
2015-03-29 00:15:41 +00:00
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.cryptsetup}/bin/cryptsetup
copy_bin_and_libs ${askPass}/bin/cryptsetup-askpass
sed -i s,/bin/sh,$out/bin/sh, $out/bin/cryptsetup-askpass
${optionalString luks.yubikeySupport ''
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.yubikey-personalization}/bin/ykchalresp
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.yubikey-personalization}/bin/ykinfo
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.openssl.bin}/bin/openssl
Update to the Yubikey PBA Security-relevant changes: * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation). * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random. * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte. Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64. * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte. Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64. * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0. Other changes: * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds. Full overview of the yubikey authentication process: (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD). (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function. Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt). (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response. (4) Repeat three times: (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user. (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response. Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength). (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success. (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise. (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator Chosen instantiation: /dev/random (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2). (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response. (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b), but with more iterations as given by iterationStep. (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks. (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD. Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep Known (software) attack vectors: * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in (1) $k_luks being recovered, (2) $new_k_luks being recovered. * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and $new_k_luks * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system. * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore. Credits: * Florian Klien, for the original concept and the reference implementation over at https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde * Anthony Thysse, for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
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cc -O3 -I${pkgs.openssl.dev}/include -L${pkgs.openssl.out}/lib ${./pbkdf2-sha512.c} -o pbkdf2-sha512 -lcrypto
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strip -s pbkdf2-sha512
copy_bin_and_libs pbkdf2-sha512
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mkdir -p $out/etc/ssl
cp -pdv ${pkgs.openssl.out}/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf $out/etc/ssl
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cat > $out/bin/openssl-wrap <<EOF
#!$out/bin/sh
export OPENSSL_CONF=$out/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf
$out/bin/openssl "\$@"
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EOF
chmod +x $out/bin/openssl-wrap
''}
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${optionalString luks.fido2Support ''
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.fido2luks}/bin/fido2luks
''}
${optionalString luks.gpgSupport ''
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.gnupg}/bin/gpg
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.gnupg}/bin/gpg-agent
copy_bin_and_libs ${pkgs.gnupg}/libexec/scdaemon
${concatMapStringsSep "\n" (x:
if x.gpgCard != null then
''
mkdir -p $out/secrets/gpg-keys/${x.device}
cp -a ${x.gpgCard.encryptedPass} $out/secrets/gpg-keys/${x.device}/cryptkey.gpg
cp -a ${x.gpgCard.publicKey} $out/secrets/gpg-keys/${x.device}/pubkey.asc
''
else ""
) (attrValues luks.devices)
}
''}
'';
boot.initrd.extraUtilsCommandsTest = ''
$out/bin/cryptsetup --version
${optionalString luks.yubikeySupport ''
$out/bin/ykchalresp -V
$out/bin/ykinfo -V
$out/bin/openssl-wrap version
''}
${optionalString luks.gpgSupport ''
$out/bin/gpg --version
$out/bin/gpg-agent --version
$out/bin/scdaemon --version
''}
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${optionalString luks.fido2Support ''
$out/bin/fido2luks --version
''}
'';
boot.initrd.preFailCommands = postCommands;
boot.initrd.preLVMCommands = commonFunctions + preCommands + concatStrings (mapAttrsToList openCommand preLVM) + postCommands;
boot.initrd.postDeviceCommands = commonFunctions + preCommands + concatStrings (mapAttrsToList openCommand postLVM) + postCommands;
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.cryptsetup ];
};
}