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mcrypt: fix several security issues (close #12194)

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CVE-2012-4409, CVE-2012-4426, CVE-2012-4527

Patches taken from https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/tree/app-crypt/mcrypt/files
This commit is contained in:
Jakob Gillich 2016-01-07 05:19:06 +01:00 committed by Vladimír Čunát
parent 9265d097d5
commit 4f4eebbded
5 changed files with 209 additions and 5 deletions
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12
pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/default.nix
View file

@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
{ stdenv, fetchurl, libmcrypt, libmhash }:
stdenv.mkDerivation rec {
version = "2.6.8";
name = "mcrypt-${version}";
src = fetchurl {
url = "mirror://sourceforge/mcrypt/MCrypt/${version}/${name}.tar.gz";
sha256 = "5145aa844e54cca89ddab6fb7dd9e5952811d8d787c4f4bf27eb261e6c182098";
};
buildInputs = [libmcrypt libmhash];
patches = [ ./format-string.patch ./overflow.patch ./segv.patch ./sprintf.patch ];
buildInputs = [ libmcrypt libmhash ];
meta = {
description = "Replacement for old UNIX crypt(1)";
longDescription = ''

31
pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/format-string.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
--- mcrypt-2.6.8/src/errors.c
+++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/errors.c
@@ -25,24 +25,24 @@
void err_quit(char *errmsg)
{
- fprintf(stderr, errmsg);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg);
exit(-1);
}
void err_warn(char *errmsg)
{
if (quiet <= 1)
- fprintf(stderr, errmsg);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg);
}
void err_info(char *errmsg)
{
if (quiet == 0)
- fprintf(stderr, errmsg);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg);
}
void err_crit(char *errmsg)
{
if (quiet <= 2)
- fprintf(stderr, errmsg);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg);
}

24
pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/overflow.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
From 3efb40e17ce4f76717ae17a1ce1e1f747ddf59fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 22 Dec 2012 22:37:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cleanup: buffer overflow
---
mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c | 2 ++
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c b/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c
index 3082f82..c7a1ac0 100644
--- a/src/extra.c
+++ b/src/extra.c
@@ -241,6 +241,8 @@ int check_file_head(FILE * fstream, char *algorithm, char *mode,
if (m_getbit(6, flags) == 1) { /* if the salt bit is set */
if (m_getbit(0, sflag) != 0) { /* if the first bit is set */
*salt_size = m_setbit(0, sflag, 0);
+ if (*salt_size > sizeof(tmp_buf))
+ err_quit(_("Salt is too long\n"));
if (*salt_size > 0) {
fread(tmp_buf, 1, *salt_size,
fstream);
--
1.7.8.6

39
pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/segv.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 5bee29fae8f0e936ad4c957aef6035d09532a57a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 22 Dec 2012 22:04:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cleanup: fixup segv on buffer access
use exact buffer size instead of guess.
do not copy out of source buffer.
Signed-off-by: Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com>
---
mcrypt-2.6.8/src/rfc2440.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/rfc2440.c b/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/rfc2440.c
index 5a1f296..929b9ab 100644
--- a/src/rfc2440.c
+++ b/src/rfc2440.c
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ plaintext_encode(const USTRING dat)
time_t t;
assert(dat->len > 0);
- result = make_ustring( NULL, 2 * dat->len); /* xxx */
+ result = make_ustring( NULL, dat->len + 12); /* xxx */
newdat = (USTRING)dat;
result->d[pos++] = (0x80 | 0x40 | PKT_PLAINTEXT);
@@ -810,7 +810,8 @@ encrypted_encode(const USTRING pt, const DEK *dek)
_mcrypt_encrypt(dek->hd, rndpref, dek->blocklen + 2, NULL, 0);
_mcrypt_sync(dek->hd, rndpref, dek->blocklen);
- ct = make_ustring( rndpref, 2 * pt->len); /* xxx */
+ ct = make_ustring( NULL, dek->blocklen + 2 + pt->len + 12); /* xxx */
+ memcpy(ct->d, rndpref, dek->blocklen + 2);
pos = dek->blocklen + 2;
_mcrypt_encrypt(dek->hd, ct->d + pos, pt->len, pt->d, pt->len);
--
1.7.8.6

108
pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/sprintf.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
Description: [CVE-2012-4527] Stack-based buffer overflow with long file names
.
A buffer overflow in mcrypt version 2.6.8 and earlier due to long filenames.
If a user were tricked into attempting to encrypt/decrypt specially crafted
long filename(s), this flaw would cause a stack-based buffer overflow that
could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution.
.
Note that this is caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, which makes this a crash-only
bug on wheezy.
Author: Attila Bogar, Jean-Michel Vourgère <jmv_deb@nirgal.com>
Origin: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2012-4527
Bug: CVE-2012-4527
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/690924
Forwarded: no
Last-Update: 2012-11-01
Index: mcrypt-2.6.8/src/mcrypt.c
===================================================================
--- mcrypt-2.6.8.orig/src/mcrypt.c
+++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/mcrypt.c
@@ -41,4 +41,6 @@
+/* Temporary error message can contain one file name and 1k of text */
+#define ERRWIDTH ((PATH_MAX)+1024)
-char tmperr[128];
+char tmperr[ERRWIDTH];
unsigned int stream_flag = FALSE;
char *keymode = NULL;
char *mode = NULL;
@@ -482,7 +485,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_STAT
if (stream_flag == FALSE) {
if (is_normal_file(file[i]) == FALSE) {
- sprintf(tmperr,
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH,
_
("%s: %s is not a regular file. Skipping...\n"),
program_name, file[i]);
@@ -501,7 +504,7 @@
dinfile = file[i];
if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdin))) == 1)
&& (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */
- sprintf(tmperr,
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH,
_
("%s: Encrypted data will not be read from a terminal.\n"),
program_name);
@@ -520,7 +523,7 @@
einfile = file[i];
if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdout))) == 1)
&& (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */
- sprintf(tmperr,
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH,
_
("%s: Encrypted data will not be written to a terminal.\n"),
program_name);
@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@
strcpy(outfile, einfile);
/* if file has already the .nc ignore it */
if (strstr(outfile, ".nc") != NULL) {
- sprintf(tmperr,
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH,
_
("%s: file %s has the .nc suffix... skipping...\n"),
program_name, outfile);
@@ -590,10 +593,10 @@
if (x == 0) {
if (stream_flag == FALSE) {
- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile);
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile);
err_warn(tmperr);
} else {
- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n"));
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n"));
err_warn(tmperr);
}
#ifdef HAVE_STAT
@@ -610,7 +613,7 @@
} else {
if (stream_flag == FALSE) {
- sprintf(tmperr,
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH,
_
("File %s was NOT decrypted successfully.\n"),
dinfile);
@@ -636,10 +639,10 @@
if (x == 0) {
if (stream_flag == FALSE) {
- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile);
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile);
err_warn(tmperr);
} else {
- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n"));
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n"));
err_warn(tmperr);
}
#ifdef HAVE_STAT
@@ -655,7 +658,7 @@
} else {
if (stream_flag == FALSE) {
- sprintf(tmperr,
+ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH,
_
("File %s was NOT encrypted successfully.\n"),
einfile);