From 4f4eebbded6b18d3e308c6e03943355a6622b489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakob Gillich Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 05:19:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] mcrypt: fix several security issues (close #12194) CVE-2012-4409, CVE-2012-4426, CVE-2012-4527 Patches taken from https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/tree/app-crypt/mcrypt/files --- pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/default.nix | 12 ++- pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/format-string.patch | 31 ++++++ pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/overflow.patch | 24 +++++ pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/segv.patch | 39 ++++++++ pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/sprintf.patch | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/format-string.patch create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/overflow.patch create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/segv.patch create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/sprintf.patch diff --git a/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/default.nix index ffd8966a80eb..52c96fda1973 100644 --- a/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/default.nix @@ -1,16 +1,18 @@ { stdenv, fetchurl, libmcrypt, libmhash }: - + stdenv.mkDerivation rec { version = "2.6.8"; name = "mcrypt-${version}"; - + src = fetchurl { url = "mirror://sourceforge/mcrypt/MCrypt/${version}/${name}.tar.gz"; sha256 = "5145aa844e54cca89ddab6fb7dd9e5952811d8d787c4f4bf27eb261e6c182098"; }; - - buildInputs = [libmcrypt libmhash]; - + + patches = [ ./format-string.patch ./overflow.patch ./segv.patch ./sprintf.patch ]; + + buildInputs = [ libmcrypt libmhash ]; + meta = { description = "Replacement for old UNIX crypt(1)"; longDescription = '' diff --git a/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/format-string.patch b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/format-string.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..322ab473811f --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/format-string.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +--- mcrypt-2.6.8/src/errors.c ++++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/errors.c +@@ -25,24 +25,24 @@ + + void err_quit(char *errmsg) + { +- fprintf(stderr, errmsg); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg); + exit(-1); + } + + void err_warn(char *errmsg) + { + if (quiet <= 1) +- fprintf(stderr, errmsg); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg); + } + + void err_info(char *errmsg) + { + if (quiet == 0) +- fprintf(stderr, errmsg); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg); + } + + void err_crit(char *errmsg) + { + if (quiet <= 2) +- fprintf(stderr, errmsg); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s", errmsg); + } diff --git a/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/overflow.patch b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bf747a58266a --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +From 3efb40e17ce4f76717ae17a1ce1e1f747ddf59fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alon Bar-Lev +Date: Sat, 22 Dec 2012 22:37:06 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cleanup: buffer overflow + +--- + mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c | 2 ++ + 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c b/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c +index 3082f82..c7a1ac0 100644 +--- a/src/extra.c ++++ b/src/extra.c +@@ -241,6 +241,8 @@ int check_file_head(FILE * fstream, char *algorithm, char *mode, + if (m_getbit(6, flags) == 1) { /* if the salt bit is set */ + if (m_getbit(0, sflag) != 0) { /* if the first bit is set */ + *salt_size = m_setbit(0, sflag, 0); ++ if (*salt_size > sizeof(tmp_buf)) ++ err_quit(_("Salt is too long\n")); + if (*salt_size > 0) { + fread(tmp_buf, 1, *salt_size, + fstream); +-- +1.7.8.6 diff --git a/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/segv.patch b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/segv.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6796163418f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/segv.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 5bee29fae8f0e936ad4c957aef6035d09532a57a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alon Bar-Lev +Date: Sat, 22 Dec 2012 22:04:27 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cleanup: fixup segv on buffer access + +use exact buffer size instead of guess. + +do not copy out of source buffer. + +Signed-off-by: Alon Bar-Lev +--- + mcrypt-2.6.8/src/rfc2440.c | 5 +++-- + 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/rfc2440.c b/mcrypt-2.6.8/src/rfc2440.c +index 5a1f296..929b9ab 100644 +--- a/src/rfc2440.c ++++ b/src/rfc2440.c +@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ plaintext_encode(const USTRING dat) + time_t t; + + assert(dat->len > 0); +- result = make_ustring( NULL, 2 * dat->len); /* xxx */ ++ result = make_ustring( NULL, dat->len + 12); /* xxx */ + newdat = (USTRING)dat; + result->d[pos++] = (0x80 | 0x40 | PKT_PLAINTEXT); + +@@ -810,7 +810,8 @@ encrypted_encode(const USTRING pt, const DEK *dek) + _mcrypt_encrypt(dek->hd, rndpref, dek->blocklen + 2, NULL, 0); + _mcrypt_sync(dek->hd, rndpref, dek->blocklen); + +- ct = make_ustring( rndpref, 2 * pt->len); /* xxx */ ++ ct = make_ustring( NULL, dek->blocklen + 2 + pt->len + 12); /* xxx */ ++ memcpy(ct->d, rndpref, dek->blocklen + 2); + pos = dek->blocklen + 2; + + _mcrypt_encrypt(dek->hd, ct->d + pos, pt->len, pt->d, pt->len); +-- +1.7.8.6 diff --git a/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/sprintf.patch b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/sprintf.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c9ade807778 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/misc/mcrypt/sprintf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +Description: [CVE-2012-4527] Stack-based buffer overflow with long file names + . + A buffer overflow in mcrypt version 2.6.8 and earlier due to long filenames. + If a user were tricked into attempting to encrypt/decrypt specially crafted + long filename(s), this flaw would cause a stack-based buffer overflow that + could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution. + . + Note that this is caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, which makes this a crash-only + bug on wheezy. +Author: Attila Bogar, Jean-Michel Vourgère +Origin: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2012-4527 +Bug: CVE-2012-4527 +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/690924 +Forwarded: no +Last-Update: 2012-11-01 +Index: mcrypt-2.6.8/src/mcrypt.c +=================================================================== +--- mcrypt-2.6.8.orig/src/mcrypt.c ++++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/mcrypt.c +@@ -41,4 +41,6 @@ + ++/* Temporary error message can contain one file name and 1k of text */ ++#define ERRWIDTH ((PATH_MAX)+1024) +-char tmperr[128]; ++char tmperr[ERRWIDTH]; + unsigned int stream_flag = FALSE; + char *keymode = NULL; + char *mode = NULL; +@@ -482,7 +485,7 @@ + #ifdef HAVE_STAT + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { + if (is_normal_file(file[i]) == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, + _ + ("%s: %s is not a regular file. Skipping...\n"), + program_name, file[i]); +@@ -501,7 +504,7 @@ + dinfile = file[i]; + if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdin))) == 1) + && (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */ +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, + _ + ("%s: Encrypted data will not be read from a terminal.\n"), + program_name); +@@ -520,7 +523,7 @@ + einfile = file[i]; + if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdout))) == 1) + && (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */ +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, + _ + ("%s: Encrypted data will not be written to a terminal.\n"), + program_name); +@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ + strcpy(outfile, einfile); + /* if file has already the .nc ignore it */ + if (strstr(outfile, ".nc") != NULL) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, + _ + ("%s: file %s has the .nc suffix... skipping...\n"), + program_name, outfile); +@@ -590,10 +593,10 @@ + + if (x == 0) { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile); ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile); + err_warn(tmperr); + } else { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n")); ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n")); + err_warn(tmperr); + } + #ifdef HAVE_STAT +@@ -610,7 +613,7 @@ + + } else { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, + _ + ("File %s was NOT decrypted successfully.\n"), + dinfile); +@@ -636,10 +639,10 @@ + + if (x == 0) { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile); ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile); + err_warn(tmperr); + } else { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n")); ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n")); + err_warn(tmperr); + } + #ifdef HAVE_STAT +@@ -655,7 +658,7 @@ + + } else { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, ERRWIDTH, + _ + ("File %s was NOT encrypted successfully.\n"), + einfile);