mirror of
https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git
synced 2024-11-27 08:01:14 +00:00
127 lines
4.7 KiB
Nix
127 lines
4.7 KiB
Nix
# Based on recommendations from:
|
|
# http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project#Recommended_settings
|
|
# https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened/Hardened_Kernel_Project
|
|
#
|
|
# Dangerous features that can be permanently (for the boot session) disabled at
|
|
# boot via sysctl or kernel cmdline are left enabled here, for improved
|
|
# flexibility.
|
|
#
|
|
# See also <nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix>
|
|
|
|
{ stdenv, version }:
|
|
|
|
with stdenv.lib;
|
|
with import ../../../../lib/kernel.nix { inherit (stdenv) lib; inherit version; };
|
|
|
|
assert (versionAtLeast version "4.9");
|
|
|
|
optionalAttrs (stdenv.hostPlatform.platform.kernelArch == "x86_64") {
|
|
DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR = freeform "65536"; # Prevent allocation of first 64K of memory
|
|
|
|
# Reduce attack surface by disabling various emulations
|
|
IA32_EMULATION = no;
|
|
X86_X32 = no;
|
|
# Note: this config depends on EXPERT y and so will not take effect, hence
|
|
# it is left "optional" for now.
|
|
MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL = option no;
|
|
VMAP_STACK = yes; # Catch kernel stack overflows
|
|
|
|
# Randomize position of kernel and memory.
|
|
RANDOMIZE_BASE = yes;
|
|
RANDOMIZE_MEMORY = yes;
|
|
|
|
# Disable legacy virtual syscalls by default (modern glibc use vDSO instead).
|
|
#
|
|
# Note that the vanilla default is to *emulate* the legacy vsyscall mechanism,
|
|
# which is supposed to be safer than the native variant (wrt. ret2libc), so
|
|
# disabling it mainly helps reduce surface.
|
|
LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE = yes;
|
|
} // {
|
|
# Report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process.
|
|
BUG = yes;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION = whenAtLeast "4.10" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Safer page access permissions (wrt. code injection). Default on >=4.11.
|
|
DEBUG_RODATA = whenOlder "4.11" yes;
|
|
DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX = whenOlder "4.11" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Mark LSM hooks read-only after init. SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS n
|
|
# conflicts with SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE y; disabling the latter
|
|
# implicitly marks LSM hooks read-only after init.
|
|
#
|
|
# SELinux can only be disabled at boot via selinux=0
|
|
#
|
|
# We set SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS n primarily for documentation purposes; the
|
|
# config builder fails to detect that it has indeed been unset.
|
|
SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE = whenAtLeast "4.12" no;
|
|
SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS = whenAtLeast "4.12" (option no);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG_WX = yes; # boot-time warning on RWX mappings
|
|
STRICT_KERNEL_RWX = whenAtLeast "4.11" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Stricter /dev/mem
|
|
STRICT_DEVMEM = option yes;
|
|
IO_STRICT_DEVMEM = option yes;
|
|
|
|
# Perform additional validation of commonly targeted structures.
|
|
DEBUG_CREDENTIALS = yes;
|
|
DEBUG_NOTIFIERS = yes;
|
|
DEBUG_LIST = yes;
|
|
DEBUG_PI_LIST = yes; # doesn't BUG()
|
|
DEBUG_SG = yes;
|
|
SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK = yes;
|
|
|
|
REFCOUNT_FULL = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Perform usercopy bounds checking.
|
|
HARDENED_USERCOPY = yes;
|
|
HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK = whenAtLeast "4.16" no; # for full whitelist enforcement
|
|
|
|
# Randomize allocator freelists.
|
|
SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM = yes;
|
|
|
|
SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED = whenAtLeast "4.14" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Randomize page allocator when page_alloc.shuffle=1
|
|
SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR = whenAtLeast "5.2" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Allow enabling slub/slab free poisoning with slub_debug=P
|
|
SLUB_DEBUG = yes;
|
|
|
|
# Wipe higher-level memory allocations on free() with page_poison=1
|
|
PAGE_POISONING = yes;
|
|
PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY = yes;
|
|
PAGE_POISONING_ZERO = yes;
|
|
|
|
# Enable the SafeSetId LSM
|
|
SECURITY_SAFESETID = whenAtLeast "5.1" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops.
|
|
PANIC_ON_OOPS = yes;
|
|
PANIC_TIMEOUT = freeform "-1";
|
|
|
|
GCC_PLUGINS = yes; # Enable gcc plugin options
|
|
# Gather additional entropy at boot time for systems that may = no;ot have appropriate entropy sources.
|
|
GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY = yes;
|
|
|
|
GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK = whenAtLeast "4.11" yes; # A port of the PaX structleak plugin
|
|
GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL = whenAtLeast "4.14" yes; # Also cover structs passed by address
|
|
GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK = whenAtLeast "4.20" yes; # A port of the PaX stackleak plugin
|
|
GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes; # A port of the PaX randstruct plugin
|
|
GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Disable various dangerous settings
|
|
ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD = no; # Allows writing directly to physical memory
|
|
PROC_KCORE = no; # Exposes kernel text image layout
|
|
INET_DIAG = no; # Has been used for heap based attacks in the past
|
|
|
|
# Use -fstack-protector-strong (gcc 4.9+) for best stack canary coverage.
|
|
CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR = whenOlder "4.18" no;
|
|
CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG = whenOlder "4.18" yes;
|
|
|
|
# Enable compile/run-time buffer overflow detection ala glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE
|
|
FORTIFY_SOURCE = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes;
|
|
|
|
}
|