For imports, it is better to use ‘modulesPath’ than rely on <nixpkgs>
being correctly set. Some users may not have <nixpkgs> set correctly.
In addition, when ‘pure-eval=true’, <nixpkgs> is unset.
Context: discussion in https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/82630
Mesa has been supporting S3TC natively without requiring these libraries
since the S3TC patent expired in December 2017.
Use types.str instead of types.path to exclude private information from
the derivation.
Add a warinig about the contents of acl beeing included in the nix
store.
Enables multi-site configurations.
This break compatibility with prior configurations that expect options
for a single dokuwiki instance in `services.dokuwiki`.
Shimming out the Let's Encrypt domain name to reuse client configuration
doesn't work properly (Pebble uses different endpoint URL formats), is
recommended against by upstream,[1] and is unnecessary now that the ACME
module supports specifying an ACME server. This commit changes the tests
to use the domain name acme.test instead, and renames the letsencrypt
node to acme to reflect that it has nothing to do with the ACME server
that Let's Encrypt runs. The imports are renamed for clarity:
* nixos/tests/common/{letsencrypt => acme}/{common.nix => client}
* nixos/tests/common/{letsencrypt => acme}/{default.nix => server}
The test's other domain names are also adjusted to use *.test for
consistency (and to avoid misuse of non-reserved domain names such
as standalone.com).
[1] https://github.com/letsencrypt/pebble/issues/283#issuecomment-545123242
Co-authored-by: Yegor Timoshenko <yegortimoshenko@riseup.net>
This was added in aade4e577b, but the
implementation of the ACME module has been entirely rewritten since
then, and the test seems to run fine on AArch64.
These now depend on an external patch set; add them to the release tests
to ensure that the build doesn't break silently as new kernel updates
are merged.
linux-hardened sets kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 by default; see
anthraxx/linux-hardened@104f44058f.
This allows the Nix sandbox to function while reducing the attack
surface posed by user namespaces, which allow unprivileged code to
exercise lots of root-only code paths and have lead to privilege
escalation vulnerabilities in the past.
We can safely leave user namespaces on for privileged users, as root
already has root privileges, but if you're not running builds on your
machine and really want to minimize the kernel attack surface then you
can set security.allowUserNamespaces to false.
Note that Chrome's sandbox requires either unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER or
setuid, and Firefox's silently reduces the security level if it isn't
allowed (see about:support), so desktop users may want to set:
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone" = true;
