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glibc: enable stackprotection hardening

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Enables previously manually disabled stackprotector and stackguard
randomization.

From https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=511811:

    If glibc is built with the --enable-stackguard-randomization option,
    each application gets a random canary value (at runtime) from /dev/urandom.
    If --enable-stackguard-randomization is absent, applications get a static
    canary value of "0xff0a0000". This is very unfortunate, because the
    attacker may be able to bypass the stack protection mechanism, by placing
    those 4 bytes in the canary word, before the actual canary check is
    performed (for example in memcpy-based buffer overflows).
This commit is contained in:
Franz Pletz 2016-09-12 02:28:26 +02:00
parent e0b5eef4e7
commit 3ba99f83a7
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 846FDED7792617B4
2 changed files with 4 additions and 1 deletions
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2
pkgs/development/libraries/glibc/common.nix
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@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation ({
"--enable-add-ons"
"--enable-obsolete-rpc"
"--sysconfdir=/etc"
"libc_cv_ssp=no"
"--enable-stackguard-randomization"
(if linuxHeaders != null
then "--with-headers=${linuxHeaders}/include"
else "--without-headers")

3
pkgs/development/libraries/glibc/default.nix
View file

@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ in
makeFlagsArray+=("bindir=$bin/bin" "sbindir=$bin/sbin" "rootsbindir=$bin/sbin")
'';
# The stackprotector and fortify hardening flags are autodetected by glibc
# and enabled by default if supported. Setting it for every gcc invocation
# does not work.
hardeningDisable = [ "stackprotector" "fortify" ];
# When building glibc from bootstrap-tools, we need libgcc_s at RPATH for