nixpkgs/pkgs/os-specific/linux/pam_ssh_agent_auth/multiple-key-files.patch

diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-12-17 19:29:16.014226336 +0000
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@
     return cookie;
 }
 
-int
+const char *
 pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
 {
     Identity *id;
     Key *key;
     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
     char *comment;
-    uint8_t retval = 0;
+    const char *key_file = 0;
 
     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
     session_id2 = pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen();
@@ -90,13 +90,11 @@
                 id->key = key;
                 id->filename = comment;
                 id->ac = ac;
-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) {
-                    retval = 1;
-                }
+                key_file = userauth_pubkey_from_id(id);
                 pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
                 pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
                 pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
-                if(retval == 1)
+                if(key_file)
                     break;
             }
         }
@@ -107,5 +105,5 @@
     }
     pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2);
     EVP_cleanup();
-    return retval;
+    return key_file;
 }
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h	2012-12-17 19:28:57.454334806 +0000
@@ -31,6 +31,6 @@
 #ifndef _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
 #define _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
 
-int pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
+const char * pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
 
 #endif
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-12-17 19:30:24.013830673 +0000
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
 
 #define strncasecmp_literal(A,B) strncasecmp( A, B, sizeof(B) - 1)
 
-char           *authorized_keys_file = NULL;
 uint8_t         allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file = 0;
 
 #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
@@ -161,15 +160,13 @@
         goto cleanexit;
     }
 
-    if(authorized_keys_file_input && user) {
-        /*
-         * user is the name of the target-user, and so must be used for validating the authorized_keys file
-         */
-        parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
-    } else {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-    }
+    if (!authorized_keys_file_input || !user)
+        authorized_keys_file_input = "/etc/security/authorized_keys";
+
+    /*
+     * user is the name of the target-user, and so must be used for validating the authorized_keys file
+     */
+    parse_authorized_key_files(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
 
     /* 
      * PAM_USER and PAM_RUSER do not necessarily have to get set by the calling application, and we may be unable to divine the latter.
@@ -177,16 +174,17 @@
      */
 
     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file_input);
 
         /* 
          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
          */
-        if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) {
-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+        const char *key_file;
+        if((key_file = pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid))) {
+            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, key_file);
             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
         } else {
-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file_input);
         }
     } else {
         pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
@@ -198,7 +196,7 @@
     free(__progname);
 #endif
 
-    free(authorized_keys_file);
+    free_authorized_key_files();
 
     return retval;
 }
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod	2012-12-17 19:52:35.968965448 +0000
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 
 =item file=<path to authorized_keys>
 
-Specify the path to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authentication. Subject to tilde and % EXPANSIONS (below) 
+Specify the path(s) to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authentication. Subject to tilde and % EXPANSIONS (below). Paths are separated using colons.
 
 =item allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file
 
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2012-12-17 19:32:20.830157313 +0000
@@ -79,66 +79,96 @@
 
 #include "identity.h"
 #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
+#include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
 
-extern char    *authorized_keys_file;
+#define MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES 16
+
+char           *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES];
+unsigned int    nr_authorized_keys_files = 0;
 extern uint8_t  allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file;
 uid_t           authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid;
 
 void
-parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
+parse_authorized_key_files(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
 {
-    char            fqdn[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
+    const char      *pos = authorized_keys_file_input;
     char            hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
-    char            auth_keys_file_buf[4096] = "";
-    char           *slash_ptr = NULL;
-    char            owner_uname[128] = "";
-    size_t          owner_uname_len = 0;
-
-    /*
-     * temporary copy, so that both tilde expansion and percent expansion both get to apply to the path
-     */
-    strncat(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_input, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+    char            fqdn[HOST_NAME_MAX] = "";
+
+#if HAVE_GETHOSTNAME
+    *hostname = '\0';
+    gethostname(fqdn, HOST_NAME_MAX);
+    strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn,"."));
+#endif
 
-    if(allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file)
-        authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+    while (pos) {
+        const char     *colon = strchr(pos, ':');
+        char            auth_keys_file_buf[4096] = "";
+        char           *slash_ptr = NULL;
+        char            owner_uname[128] = "";
+        size_t          owner_uname_len = 0;
+
+        strncat(auth_keys_file_buf, pos, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+        if (colon) {
+            auth_keys_file_buf[colon - pos] = 0;
+            pos = colon + 1;
+        } else {
+            pos = 0;
+        }
 
-    if(*auth_keys_file_buf == '~') {
-        if(*(auth_keys_file_buf+1) == '/') {
+        if(allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file)
             authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+
+        if(*auth_keys_file_buf == '~') {
+            if(*(auth_keys_file_buf+1) == '/') {
+                authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+            }
+            else {
+                slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf,'/');
+                if(!slash_ptr)
+                    pamsshagentauth_fatal("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+
+                owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+                if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1) ) 
+                    pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
+
+                strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+                if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+                    authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+            }
+            char *tmp = pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+            strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, tmp, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
+            pamsshagentauth_xfree(tmp);
         }
-        else {
-            slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf,'/');
-            if(!slash_ptr)
-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
-
-            owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
-            if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1) ) 
-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-
-            strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
-            if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
-                authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+
+        if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
+            authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
         }
-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-        strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
-    }
 
-    if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
-        authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid = getpwnam(user)->pw_uid;
+        if (nr_authorized_keys_files >= MAX_AUTHORIZED_KEY_FILES)
+            pamsshagentauth_fatal("Too many authorized key files");
+        authorized_keys_files[nr_authorized_keys_files++] =
+            pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
     }
+}
 
-#if HAVE_GETHOSTNAME
-    *hostname = '\0';
-    gethostname(fqdn, HOST_NAME_MAX);
-    strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn,"."));
-#endif
-    authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+void
+free_authorized_key_files()
+{
+    unsigned int n;
+    for (n = 0; n < nr_authorized_keys_files; n++)
+        free(authorized_keys_files[n]);
+    nr_authorized_keys_files = 0;
 }
 
-int
+const char *
 pam_user_key_allowed(Key * key)
 {
-    return pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_file)
-        || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_file);
+    unsigned int n;
+    for (n = 0; n < nr_authorized_keys_files; n++) {
+        if (pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_files[n])
+            || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_files[n]))
+            return authorized_keys_files[n];
+    }
+    return 0;
 }
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2010-01-13 02:17:01.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2012-12-17 19:24:34.477894517 +0000
@@ -28,11 +28,12 @@
  */
 
 
-#ifndef _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
-#define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+#ifndef _PAM_USER_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_H
+#define _PAM_USER_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_H
 
 #include "identity.h"
-int pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
-void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
+const char * pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
+void parse_authorized_key_files(const char *, const char *);
+void free_authorized_key_files();
 
 #endif
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2012-06-28 01:47:49.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2012-12-17 19:27:30.813843933 +0000
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 extern u_char  *session_id2;
 extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
 
-int
+const char *
 userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
 {
     Buffer          b = { 0 };
@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@
     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
     u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
     int             authenticated = 0;
+    const char     *key_file;
 
     pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
 
     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
-    if(! pam_user_key_allowed(id->key))
+    if(!(key_file = pam_user_key_allowed(id->key)))
         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
 
     if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
@@ -96,5 +97,5 @@
     if(pkblob != NULL)
         pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-    return authenticated;
+    return authenticated ? key_file : 0;
 }
diff -ru -x '*~' pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4-orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2010-01-13 02:17:01.000000000 +0000
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2012-12-17 19:25:54.893412987 +0000
@@ -32,6 +32,6 @@
 #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
 
 #include <identity.h>
-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
+const char * userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
 
 #endif